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In the months leading up to the 2002 elections, the
eyes of political pollsters and pundits were on America’s
suburbs. The notion that the suburbs are where elec-
tions are won or lost has become an unassailable idée
fixe in contemporary politics. While there is certainly
some truth to this premise, it obscures the more com-
plex reality that “the suburbs” are in fact a remarkably
diverse collection of communities with a broad range of
differing strengths and weaknesses.
A close look at America’s 25 largest metropolitan
areas shows that far from being a monolith, the sub-
urbs actually comprise several distinct types. Some
inner-ring suburban communities suffer from the same
urban ills that afflict inner cities, such as poverty and
racial segregation. Many developing suburbs on the
fringes of metropolitan areas are experiencing explo-
sive population growth but have limited resources to
pay for the schools, sewers, and roads that this growth
requires. Still others enjoy the tax benefits of large con-
centrations of office space and high-end housing, but
are plagued by traffic congestion and degradation of
the open space that made them attractive places to live
in the first place.
The prevailing catch-as-catch-can pattern of metro-
politan development, which encourages wasteful intra-
regional competition and environmentally damaging
land use, hurts all types of suburbs. Socioeconomic seg-
regation, fiscal inequality, and sprawl plague virtually
every metropolitan area, and appear to be growing worse
in most of them. At least 40 percent of the metropolitan
population resides in suburbs with social or fiscal chal-
lenges severe enough to be considered “at risk” in our
classification. Another 25 percent lives in rapidly devel-
oping communities that are struggling to keep up with
their explosive growth with limited financial resources. 
A three-pronged attack of tax reform, land use
reform, and regional government reform is needed to
stem this tide. Though the obstacles are formidable,
there is reason for optimism. Every type of metropolitan
community—from central cities wrestling with poverty
and other social ills to the affluent outer-ring suburbs
beset by traffic congestion and runaway development—
stands to benefit from these reforms. Political parties
and leaders who can persuade metropolitan voters to
act in their long-term self-interest on these issues will
be rewarded with far greater gains than those chasing
the vagaries of shifting polls.
n the inner-ring Chicago suburb of
Cicero, where a visit by Martin Luther King
once precipitated a violent protest against
housing integration, nonwhite students are
now in the majority. In the mid-1990’s in
Cherokee County, an Atlanta suburb com-
prised largely of bedroom developing com-
munities, students often attended schools set up in
trailers as their communities had neither the tax base
nor other resources to build new schools for a growing
population. At the same time, schools were closing for
lack of students in the region’s core. Lopatcong
Township, New Jersey, an area at the fringes of the New
York region making the transition from rural to subur-
ban, is defending its 2003 ordinance to limit multifam-
ily dwellings to two bedrooms, effectively zoning out
families with children in order to keep school enroll-
ment (and costs) down. The proliferation of large-lot
housing developments in suburban Macomb County,
Michigan, has contaminated a nearby lake due to a
rash of failed septic systems, which will cost between
$2 billion and $4 billion to convert to sewer.
These examples reflect the fragmentation that lies
at the heart of America’s new suburban reality. If the
suburbs were ever a homogeneous bastion of untrou-
bled prosperity, they certainly are no longer. Evidence
for this goes well beyond the anecdotal: An analysis of
the 25 largest metropolitan areas demonstrates that
varying social and economic pressures have led to the
emergence of distinct types of suburban communities
that differ from one another in identifiable ways.
A method known as cluster analysis was used to
group suburban areas according to several measures of
their fiscal characteristics (specifically, their ability to
raise tax revenue and the change over time in that abil-
ity) as well as key factors that directly or indirectly
affect the cost of providing local services (including
poverty levels, population density and growth, age of
housing, and racial composition). The cluster analysis
identified six types of communities, three of which face
economic or social challenges severe enough to be
considered “at risk.”
The health of any community is largely a function
of whether it has adequate resources to meet its partic-
ular needs. Two of the most significant factors used in
the cluster analysis are school populations, which
affect the “needs” side of the ledger, and tax capacity,
on the “resources” side. 
Schools are a powerful indicator of a community’s
current health and of its future well-being. As the num-
ber of poor children in a community’s schools grows,
middle-class families’ demand for housing in the com-
munity softens, and housing prices reflect this decline.
Families with school-age children are likely to leave
first because changes in the schools affect them most.
Some non-poor families may choose to stay in the
community but put their children in private schools,
though few households can afford the additional
expense for long. A community with schools in transi-
tion may also draw “empty-nesters” and other non-
poor households without school-age children. Poverty
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If the suburbs were ever
a homogeneous bastion
of untroubled prosperity,
they certainly are
no longer.
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rates among school-age children therefore tend to rise
more quickly than the overall poverty rate.
Although poverty and its consequences underlie eco-
nomic segregation, it is difficult to separate poverty from
race and ethnicity—particularly for African Americans
and Latinos, who are strongly discriminated against in
the housing market. Sadly, an analysis of racial data for
elementary school students in the 25 largest metropoli-
tan areas shows that once the minority share in a com-
munity’s schools increases to a threshold level (10 to 20
percent), racial transition accelerates until minority per-
centages reach very high levels (greater than 80 percent).
While trends in a community’s school population
indicate critical local needs, local tax capacity is a good
measure of the ability to raise revenues to meet those
needs. Communities with copious tax resources have
low tax rates and great services. Resource-poor com-
munities have just the opposite. Why is this? Think of it
this way: if a community’s tax wealth per household is
$100, a 10 percent tax rate raises $10 per household for
services; if tax wealth is $1,000 per household, the
same rate raises $100. No matter how smart adminis-
trators are, and no matter how much reorganization
they do, they cannot avoid this basic math.
One of the three at-risk suburban types identified
by the cluster analysis is comprised of aging communi-
ties that have very low tax capacity, high municipal
costs, and—most distinctively—high concentrations of
minority children in the public schools. As a group,
these at-risk segregated communities had per-house-
hold tax capacities that were less than two-thirds of the
metropolitan area average, and the slowest growth in
tax capacity of all the suburban types. On the cost side,
this group had very high poverty rates (nearly twice the
regional average), lower-than-average population
growth, aging housing stock, a population density
almost four times the regional average, and a higher
percentage of minority children in the public schools
than even the central cities.
The at-risk segregated communities are some of
metropolitan America’s worst places to live. Poor and
segregated, they have a fraction of the resources of the
central cities they surround. In 1994, the taxes on a
$100,000 house in the at-risk segregated suburb of
Maywood, Illinois, were $4,672. This level of taxation
would support local school spending of $3,350 per
The close relationship
between racially segregated com-
munities and areas of concentrat-
ed poverty has been used to sup-
port flawed conclusions about
African-Americans and Latinos.
Some people, associating an influx
of minorities into a community
with social and economic decline,
conclude that minority residents
somehow contribute less than
whites to a community’s health
and stability.
Nowhere was this tragic mis-
conception better illustrated than
in a segment from the television
news magazine NBC Dateline
about the white-collar Chicago
suburb of Matteson, Illinois, 20
miles south of the Loop. In the
early to mid-1990s, black middle-
class families began to move to
Matteson, a community of large,
attractive suburban homes, open
space, and good schools. These
blacks were, by most important
demographic measures, at least
the socioeconomic equals of
Matteson’s white residents. Some
were, in fact, better off than
Matteson’s whites. But as soon as
black households became a signifi-
cant percentage of the population,
there was a sudden sell-off of
homes by white residents. Asked
why they were moving, the white
sellers replied, "Because the
schools are getting worse and
crime is increasing." On the evi-
dence, neither claim was true.
School test scores and the crime
rate remained unchanged.
However, once the white residents
left, demand for middle-class
housing in Matteson cooled,
because the black middle class
was not large enough to sustain
market demand. Not only did the
schools become more segregated,
they also became much poorer.
This is why "white flight" invariably
means poverty—this tragic
sequence of events has played
itself out in countless suburbs
across the country.
The Truth About White Flight
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pupil. In Kenilworth, an affluent suburb to the north,
the taxes would be $2,688, yet this lower rate, applied
to the whole tax base, would support almost three
times the level of spending per pupil. Similarly, busi-
ness taxes on a 100,000-square-foot office building in
booming DuPage County were $212,639, compared
with $468,000 in south suburban Cook County.
A second category of at-risk communities—made
up mostly of inner-ring suburbs and outlying cities
that have been swallowed up by metropolitan
growth—has older housing stock than any of the other
suburban groups. Like the at-risk segregated commu-
nities, these at-risk older communities have relatively
low tax capacity and tax-capacity growth, and even
higher density, but they also have relatively low levels
of poverty and of minority children in public schools.
These places often stand cheek by jowl with the at-risk
segregated suburbs, and there is often a strongly
defended racial line between them. In fact, though, the
at-risk segregated and older communities have many
common concerns. Both groups have slow (or even
negative) population growth, relatively meager local
resources, and struggling commercial districts. Their
main street corridors and commercial districts cannot
attract new, big businesses that could easily build on
greenfield sites. Despite these commonalities, segre-
gated and older at-risk suburbs have not formed a
cohesive political whole, probably because they are
often divided on the issue of race.
Many communities included in the third at-risk
group are exurbs on the fringes of the metropolitan
areas that are making the transition from rural to sub-
urban. These at-risk low-density communities share the
characteristics of low tax capacity and low-tax-capacity
growth with the other at-risk suburbs, but they differ in
other important ways. Many are just beginning the
transition from rural or farm land to suburban develop-
ment patterns. Their relatively low fiscal resources are
thus stretched thin by demands for new infrastructure
and the other accoutrements of growth. Compared to
most other suburban areas, they must also cope with
significantly higher-than-average poverty.
The fourth suburban type represents what many
would regard as the quintessential suburb. Bedroom-
developing communities have rapidly growing popula-
tions that tend to be white and relatively affluent.
Density is low, housing is new, and tax capacity is just
below average but growing at an average rate. Although
this group contained about a quarter of the population
of the metropolitan areas studied, it had nearly 60 per-
Table 1. Characteristics of the Community Types
Communities with 
copious tax resources 
have low tax rates and
great services. Resource-
poor communities have
just the opposite.
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All Suburban Types
Table 2. Segregation by Income in Elementary Schools
Dissimilarity Indexes for 1992 and 1997
Table 3. Racial Segregation in Metropolitan Populations
and Elementary Schools: Dissimilarity Indexes in Selected Years
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cent of the population growth in those areas. Though
not experiencing the social stress of some of the at-risk
communities, bedroom-developing suburbs must
manage the costs of a high rate of population growth
with only average (or below-average) local resources.
Both the at-risk low-density and the bedroom-
developing suburbs share fiscal pressures arising from
school and infrastructure finance. In all the large met-
ropolitan areas, the student-to-household ratio in
these two types of communities is much higher than
the regional average. Because of this ratio and their (at
best) average tax base, these suburbs often have the
lowest per-pupil spending in metropolitan America.
Developmental infrastructure such as roads and sew-
ers can also present large challenges for the at-risk and
bedroom-developing suburbs.
The last two classifications include many of the so-
called “edge cities”: suburban communities with vast
amounts of office space and more jobs than bedrooms.
Affluent job centers (and the even more prosperous
very affluent job centers) reap the benefits of extraordi-
nary tax bases—capacities of more than two and five
times the regional averages, respectively—that are
growing at rates outstripping regional averages.
Collectively, they have more than four times the office
space per household of any other group of suburbs,
more even than central cities. At the same time, cost
factors such as poverty and age of housing are well
below regional averages. As might be expected, the
political and business leaders in these communities
work hard to maintain their quality of life, and, of all
types of suburbs, they are the ones that have revolted
most successfully against growth and sprawl.
These places might seem to have it all: affluent resi-
dents, a high tax base, an average number of children,
and very low poverty. However, the mass of jobs and
commercial activity also has its downside. First,
because many workers cannot afford the local housing,
these beehives of local activity generally have intense
traffic congestion. Second, because land becomes so
valuable it is often difficult to maintain open space.
Well over half (56 percent) of the suburban popula-
tion of the metropolitan areas included in the study
lived in at-risk communities. Yet they controlled only
38 percent of local tax capacity in the suburbs.
Conversely, the two clusters of affluent job centers
accounted for less than 10 percent of the suburban
population, but had 22 percent of the local tax capaci-
ty. Poverty levels and other cost factors diverge in
equally dramatic fashion. These disparities point to a
widening gulf between “have” and “have not” suburbs.
In fact, quantitative analyses show that both eco-
nomic and racial segregation in America’s schools rose
during the 1990s. Dissimilarity indexes—general meas-
In the Detroit region many
moderate-income workers in the
automobile or related industries
seek out their bit of paradise in the
rapidly developing northern quad-
rant of Macomb County, northeast
of Detroit, where they can afford a
lot of land and pay low taxes. But
this package deal does not include
sewer systems or roads. With their
low fiscal capacity and the federal
government’s declining commit-
ment to finance suburban sewer
improvements, these suburbs have
no way to pay for the thousand of
miles of sewers they need, esti-
mated to cost between $2 billion
and $4 billion.
The communities of Macomb
County—which, though they
include a combination of all the
suburban types, are predomi-
nantly at-risk low-density and
bedroom-developing suburbs—
represent a powerful example of
the downside of unplanned
growth from a base of low fiscal
capacity. Throughout the 1990s,
Lake St. Clair, a large freshwater
lake on the county’s eastern bor-
der, was becoming unsafe for
swimming. Of the eight public
beaches monitored on Macomb
County’s web page, all were
closed several days during the
summer of 2001 because of E.
coli from untreated sewage. At
least one of the lake’s large pub-
lic beaches was closed for the
entire summer. Failed septic sys-
tems caused much of this prob-
lem, but several of the cities
have recently admitted to dump-
ing raw sewage into the water-
ways feeding Lake St. Clair.
Trouble In Paradise
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ures of the degree of segregation—show that metropol-
itan areas with increased economic and racial segrega-
tion in elementary schools between 1992 and 1997
outnumbered metro areas with reduced segregation
during those same years. 
Tax-base inequality also increased during the 1990s.
A general measure of inequality in tax bases known as
the Gini coefficient indicated an average increase of
about 8 percent in the 25 largest metropolitan areas
between 1993 and 1998, with 18 of the metro areas
showing increases in inequality.
Comparing the Gini coefficients for the 25 largest
U.S. metropolitan areas in 1998 to the economic and
racial dissimilarity indexes for the same cities in 1997
shows just how closely tax-base inequality in a metro-
politan area correlates with income and racial segrega-
tion. Seven of the 10 metropolitan areas with the most
unequal tax-base distributions are also among the 10
areas with the greatest degree of income segregation in
schools and 9 of the 10 are among the 10 areas showing
the greatest degrees of racial segregation in schools.
Urban sprawl indicators also correlate strongly with
measures of segregation and inequality. Regions where
population density in the urbanized areas declined the
most tend to show the greatest degrees of racial segre-
gation and tax-base inequality. Comparing the sprawl
data with tax capacity data for different types of com-
munities shows that sprawl affects the fiscal health of
sprawling communities. The average tax capacity for
at-risk, low-density suburbs in the 12 metropolitan
areas with the greatest degrees of sprawl is 60 percent
of the regional average; in the 13 metro areas with the
least sprawl, the average capacity is 78 percent of the
regional average. Likewise, the capacities for bedroom-
developing suburbs are 82 percent of the regional aver-
age in sprawling metro areas, and 101 percent of the
average in more contained areas. Clearly, the suburban
areas most directly affected by sprawl are fiscally
stronger relative to the rest of their metropolitan areas
in regions where growth is managed more effectively. 
9
Table 4. 1993 and 1998 Gini Coefficients:
Tax Capacity per Household
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Atlanta’s elementary schools show a pattern typical of many
metropolitan areas – very high poverty rates in central city schools
along with high and growing poverty rates in many nearby suburban
schools. Relatively high free lunch eligibility rates in the suburbs are
most pronounced south and southeast of the city of Atlanta. 
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Map 1. Atlanta Region (Central Area): Percentage of Elementary
Students Eligible for Free Lunch by School, 1997
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Map 2. Denver Region (Central Area): Percentage of Elementary Students
Eligible for Free Lunch by School, 1997
School poverty in the Denver region also shows the typical pattern,
focused in the city of Denver and in suburbs immediately north and east
of the city.
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As in most metropolitan areas, poverty and race in Atlanta schools
are correlated. Non-Asian minority percentages tend to be highest
where poverty rates are highest (Map 1). Minority percentages are
highest in the city of Atlanta and its southern and eastern suburbs.
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Map 3. Atlanta Region (Central Area): Percentage Non-Asian
Elementary Students by School, 1997
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Map 4. Denver Region (Central Area): Percentage Non-Asian Elementary
Students by School, 1997
The distribution of non-Asian minority students mirrors the one for
poor students with the highest minority shares in the city of Denver and
its northern and eastern suburbs.
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Tax capacity measures the ability of local governments to raise
revenue from all of the taxes available to them. Lower than average
tax capacities per household are focused in the core of the New York
region. The lowest capacities are found in and around Newark and
Jersey City, New Jersey but lower-than-average capacities can also be
found in parts of Long Island and in outer suburbs in the northwest-
ern part of the region.
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Map 5. New York Region (Central Area): Tax Capacity
per Household by Municipality, 1998
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he many challenges facing America’s
metropolitan areas can be attacked effec-
tively only through a coordinated, region-
al approach. Concentrated poverty and
community disinvestments, among the
most important of the countless factors
feeding metropolitan sprawl, are related
to incentives built into public policies for metropolitan
development. These incentives include tax policies
that promote wasteful competition among local gov-
ernments, transportation and infrastructure invest-
ment patterns that subsidize sprawling development,
and fragmented governance that makes thoughtful and
efficient land-use planning more difficult.
Fortunately, the foundations for positive change
are, to a large extent, already in place. Regional tax
reform, which involves a more equitable fiscal relation-
ship among the cities in a metropolitan area, has its
roots in the state school-aid systems that exist in virtu-
ally every state in the country. Land-use reform to
combat sprawl is a growing issue in the nation, and 16
states have already adopted comprehensive growth-
management acts. Federal law has required that
regional governments coordinate hundreds of millions
of transportation dollars in every region in the country;
the challenge now is to make these existing regional
governments more effective and more accountable to
the people they serve.
Tax Reform
Under the fiscal system that currently holds sway in
most regions of the country, local governments have
strong incentives to adopt policies and regulations
designed to serve their own short-term economic
interest at the expense of their own long-term health
and the well-being of the region as a whole.
One way that local governments do this is through
“fiscal zoning,” a deliberate attempt by a government
to reap fiscal dividends from new development by lim-
iting the types of land uses within its jurisdiction.
Because property taxes are the most significant form of
revenue for most local governments, they have a direct
incentive to tailor their land-use regulations to encour-
age development of high-value commercial, industrial,
and residential properties that generate relatively little
in public costs, and to discourage development of
lower-value properties such as affordable housing that
create a need for higher public expenditures. When
played out over an entire metropolitan area, this fiscal
zoning process can significantly influence where peo-
ple can afford to live, the types and quality of public
services they receive from their local government, and
the presence or absence of employment opportunities
near their homes.
Another aspect of local governments’ short-sighted
pursuit of positive fiscal dividends is the wasteful and
biased competition for desirable commercial and
industrial properties. It is wasteful because one com-
munity’s gain is likely to be another community’s loss.
The resources expended in such competition typically
do not enhance the overall regional economy, but only
shuffle activity from one place to another. It is biased
because it creates the potential for a vicious, self-rein-
forcing cycle of decline in places that “lose” early in the
game. As a locality loses activities that generate posi-
tive fiscal dividends, it must either raise taxes on its
remaining tax base to maintain services at existing lev-
els or reduce services at existing tax rates. Either choice
further reduces the locality’s ability to compete for
additions to its tax base or to keep its existing base.
Fiscal zoning and tax-base competition tend to
concentrate families and individuals with the greatest
17
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need for public services in communities that are the
least able to generate the revenue to provide those
services. Conversely, those who can afford to live
where they choose (and therefore are less in need of
public services) are increasingly concentrated in com-
munities that have managed to successfully attract the
development of large, expensive homes and other rev-
enue-generating land uses. The result is a widening
gap between communities with low tax capacities and
high costs, on the one hand, and those with high tax
capacities and low costs on the other.
The arguments for tax reform are primarily efficien-
cy arguments. Attenuating the link between growth in
particular types of local land uses and the tax base
available to produce local services reduces wasteful
competition. Providing financial incentives for particu-
lar types of development that provide regional benefits
but do not generate local fiscal dividends can improve
the functioning of regional housing and labor markets.
An essential part of creating a stable, cooperative
region is to gradually equalize the resources of local
governments with land-use planning powers. In addi-
tion to improving equity, which will allow central cities,
at-risk suburbs, and many bedroom-developing sub-
urbs to lower taxes and improve services, it will reduce
the competition between places, give communities
real fiscal incentives to cooperate, and make regional
land-use planning easier to achieve.
Many states attempt to reduce fiscal inequity
among jurisdictions through revenue-sharing pro-
grams that distribute a portion of the revenue from
one or more state taxes to local governments through a
variety of formulas. Although most revenue-sharing
programs began with a simple per-capita approach,
they now generally place greater emphasis on the com-
munities’ needs, typically determined by characteris-
tics such as tax base, revenues, spending, or some
combination of the three. Equity measures improve for
all but two of the 25 largest metropolitan areas when
aid is added to local tax capacity. However, the effects
of aid vary considerably, ranging from a 63 percent
change for the better in the inequality measure to an
11 percent change for the worse.
Tax-base sharing, an alternative way to reduce tax-
base inequities, has several advantages over the patch-
work quilt of aid programs common to most states.
Unlike separate programs that distribute state rev-
enues to counties, cities, townships, and special dis-
tricts, tax-base sharing simply redistributes the com-
mon base from which each local jurisdiction derives its
revenues. It also helps to equalize the resources avail-
able to local governments without removing local con-
trol over tax rates. Further, by requiring local govern-
ments to relinquish some of their fiscal dividend from
new commercial/industrial development, tax-base
sharing reduces the incentive to waste taxpayer dollars
by stealing it away from other communities. Similarly,
including residential property in tax-base sharing
dilutes local governments’ incentives to use fiscal zon-
ing or its substitutes to restrict residential develop-
ment to “profitable” types of housing, making coopera-
tive, efficient land-use planning easier.
With tax-base sharing, a portion of each locality’s
tax base (or growth in tax base) is contributed to a
regional pool and redistributed according to criteria
such as tax capacity, service cost or need indicators, or
land-use decisions. In Minneapolis-St. Paul, the only
metropolitan area for which tax-base sharing legisla-
tion has actually been enacted, local tax-base dispari-
ties were reduced by roughly 20 percent by the pro-
gram in the year 2000. Simulations for other metropoli-
tan areas show that tax-base sharing is a much more
cost-effective means of reducing tax-base equity than
existing aid programs. Tax-base sharing reduces dis-
parities by 2 percentage points for each percentage
point of shared revenues, while current aid programs
reduce disparities by just half of a percentage point for
each percentage point of aid.
Reforms in these policy areas need not be radical.
All states provide at least some financial support to
local governments. A reform agenda can begin with
incremental improvements in the way current aid is
efforts by individual communitites to unilateral-
ly curb development within their boundaries often
end up contributing to sprawl instead of reducing
it. In 1972, the San Francisco region city of
Petaluma decided to slow growth by limiting the
number of building permits issued annually. This
caused a dramatic increase in housing demand in
farther-out Santa Rosa. According to U.S. Census
figures, the population of the Santa Rosa area
nearly doubled between 1970 and 1980. In the end,
Santa Rosa had to build new roads and sewers,
and residents of Petaluma were forced to deal with
the increased traffic through their community.
How Not To Curb Growth
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allocated. Tax-base-sharing programs can be designed
to capture a portion of tax-base growth, as occurred in
the Twin Cities, rather than part of existing tax bases,
allowing regions to reap the efficiency benefits immedi-
ately while the redistributive impacts grow more slowly.
Land-Use Reform
Individual communities can do little to deal with the
underlying regional forces contributing to sprawling
development patterns. While local development mora-
toriums, slowdowns, or other local restrictions may
seem like a good strategy for reducing the negative
impacts of increased development, ultimately they
only throw development farther out to surrounding
communities eager to attract additional development
to add to their tax base and help them keep up with
the costs of their residential growth. In many cases,
these surrounding communities are at-risk low-density
and bedroom-developing communities trying to keep
up with their growing costs.
A number of states have tried to tackle the difficul-
ties associated with purely local land-use planning
through some form of statewide planning. At present,
16 states have a land-use planning system in place; 10
of these states actually require comprehensive local
planning, while the other 6 encourage it. Oregon led
the way with the passage of its Land Use Act in 1973.
This landmark legislation requires each of the state’s
cities and counties to adopt a long-range, comprehen-
sive plan for development consistent with the state’s
specified planning goals.
Another popular strategy employed by states to com-
bat sprawling development has been to authorize and
encourage the use of various “smart growth” tools.
Common growth-management tools include the urban
growth boundary, which prevents or limits development
outside a designated area; the urban service area, which
limits provision of public services such as sewerage and
water to a designated area; designated areas where
growth will be focused; and concurrency, which requires
adequate public infrastructure to be in place before or
at the same time as development occurs. These can be
effective tools. Misused or used in isolation without
complementary policies in the non-developing portions
of regions, however, they can contribute to low-density,
dispersed development instead of preventing it.
Smart-growth planning also attempts to protect
agricultural lands and open space from development,
maintaining the amenity value of such areas and pre-
serving them for future generations. To this end, many
states and regions create agricultural district programs,
purchase agriculture conservation easements or devel-
opment rights through state land trust funds, and
allow the transfer of development rights from a rural to
an urban location. These land-preservation tools,
though well-intentioned, are extremely costly and can-
not on their own truly change the nature of U.S. devel-
opment patterns.
Effective regional land-use reform hinges on three
elements: coordinated infrastructure planning, a
regional housing plan, and regional review and coordi-
nation of local planning.
Coordinated Infrastucture Planning. Piecemeal provi-
sion of the basic infrastructure that guides regional
investment and development patterns is a major con-
tributor to inefficient, sprawling development, con-
gested roadways, and environmental strains.
Regionalizing infrastructure provision and planning
helps guide development in more efficient and equi-
table ways. It can, for instance, help reduce per capita
costs throughout the region by creating an orderly pat-
tern of development. Transportation investments are
an especially important part of regional infrastructure
that should be coordinated with other investments,
and giving a regional agency authority over transporta-
tion investments is one way to help achieve this goal.
Regional Housing Plan. A regional strategy to reduce
zoning, financial, and other barriers to the develop-
ment of affordable housing is the logical first step
toward the goal of mixed-income housing in every
community within a region. The housing industry has
long argued that regulatory barriers such as large lot
sizes, prohibitions on multifamily housing, and assort-
ed fees hurt the natural marketplace for affordable
housing. Removing such barriers is a step that the
building community can accept, and is a way to devel-
op a relationship with an important private-sector
actor in land development.
Fair-share requirements ensure that all places con-
tribute to the regionwide supply of affordable housing.
These programs allocate to each city a part of the
region’s affordable housing, on the basis of the jurisdic-
tion’s population, previous efforts to create affordable
housing, and job availability. An effective fair-share
housing program seeks a sustainable balance of lower-
cost and more expensive housing in all areas of the
region, whether they are greenfield suburban sites or
gentrifying neighborhoods.
Regional Review and Coordination of Local Planning.
Because much land-use and infrastructure planning is
best provided at the local level, regional land-use
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reform requires a coordinated framework in which
local governments develop comprehensive land-use
plans that are consistent with state or regional plan-
ning goals. Ideally, these goals are clearly laid out and
applicable to all communities within the region, and
any local plans and policies inconsistent with these
goals may be challenged in court or in special forums
created for such adjudication. There should be strong
penalties for noncompliance, such as financial sanc-
tions or the loss of authority to make land-use deci-
sions and to grant building permits.
Metropolitan Governance Reform
The fragmentation of metropolitan areas into many
local governments is not only a barrier to effective
growth management, but also a leading cause of racial
and economic segregation, sprawl, and fiscal dispari-
ties within those areas. In regions without a shared tax
base or dominant central city, competing jurisdictions
often duplicate infrastructure and services that could
be provided more cost effectively in older suburbs and
central cities. Duplication of services and infrastruc-
ture in turn contributes to fiscal, social, and environ-
mental stresses in the at-risk communities at the core
of metropolitan regions as well as in those at the edge.
Zoning incentives to attract high-value residential and
commercial development result in exclusive neighbor-
hoods, segregated by race and income. Meanwhile, the
new office and commercial centers in suburban edge
cities siphon customers and resources from estab-
lished business districts and allow the commuter zone
to expand, further inducing sprawl.
Recognizing fragmentation’s negative effects, a
number of regions have acted to bring a greater
regional focus to local governance. Metropolitan plan-
ning organizations are the most widespread form of
regional governance in the U.S. today. MPOs were cre-
ated by Congress in the 1970s to address the growing
transportation challenges in metropolitan regions.
Given broad powers to guide regional growth through
long-range transportation planning and the allocation
of federal transportation funds to individual jurisdic-
tions, the MPOs in America’s 25 largest metropolitan
areas are, in a very real sense, special-purpose regional
governing bodies.
However, MPOs are not directly accountable to vot-
ers and do not always make their transportation
investments with social separation, sprawl, and fiscal
inequities in mind. Without broader authority and a
mandate to address these assorted issues comprehen-
sively, MPOs are limited in what they can accomplish
on regional concerns.
Several regional councils and associations designat-
ed as MPOs have, either by state mandate or through
their own initiative, taken on myriad other functions,
attempting to fill the void in regional governance creat-
ed by political fragmentation. Some of the most com-
mon duties taken on by MPO staff include air quality
conformity planning, local and regional economic
development initiatives, land-use plan review and
coordination, ride-share services, and regional demo-
graphic and economic forecasting.
A strong, accountable regional governing body is an
essential part of a comprehensive regional reform plan.
The following strategies will help to ensure the long-
term viability of any regional governing body, whether
an MPO with expanded authority or some other
regional body.
Strategy 1: Apportion voting membership by popula-
tion. Decisions on how and where to spend taxpayer
dollars for regional investments should be made in a
fair and equitable manner, giving equal representation
to all types of communities and residents in a region.
two regions—Portland, Oregon, and Minneapolis-
St. Paul—have vested significant and comprehen-
sive planning powers in a single regional govern-
ment body. Portland Metro controls development
patterns through its administration of the state-
mandated regional urban growth boundary. The
Twin Cities Metropolitan Council regulates the
expansion of its Metropolitan Urban Service Area
through its authority to plan for and permit exten-
sions to the regional sewer system.
These formal powers, complemented by council
members’ accountability to the governor in
Minnesota and directly to the voters in Portland,
give these regional governments political leverage
that other metropolitan planning organizations and
regional councils lack. Unlike most MPOs, mem-
bers of the Portland and Twin Cities councils are
unaffiliated with local governments and state agen-
cies. This detachment from parochial interests
gives Metro and the Met Council unique freedom to
focus exclusively on regional needs and concerns.
Regionalism at Work
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Strategy 2: Hold direct elections for voting members.
Direct elections of members of regional governing
bodies would make regional decision-making more
open and participatory. Even without expanding the
current scope of MPO powers, direct election of MPO
boards would create a legitimate forum for the discus-
sion of regional issues. Any increase in MPOs’ powers
would make direct election even more important.
Strategy 3: Broaden and deepen public awareness of
how transportation investments contribute to or allevi-
ate social separation and sprawl. Regional bodies
should be required to evaluate their transportation
decisions to determine whether they worsen or allevi-
ate social separation and sprawling development pat-
terns in the region.
Strategy 4: Broaden the scope of land-use planning.
MPOs or another regional body should develop an
advisory land-use plan for the region that embodies a
vision for efficiently coordinating all major forms of
developmental infrastructure. These advisory land-use
plans might offer cities incentives to submit for review
comprehensive plans covering such issues as sustain-
able development, affordable housing, and public
transit.
Table 5. Revenue Capacity Equity Before and After Aid From 
State Governments and Tax Base Sharing
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conomists and others have made the
important point that regional cooperation
helps every community, but the parochial
costs and benefits of regional reforms vary
by community type within metropolitan
areas. Therefore, making the case for
regionalism requires an understanding of
the nature of the different suburban community types
and the ways they may benefit from the various
reforms.
The At-Risk Developed Suburbs
The case for regional reform to present to the at-risk
segregated and at-risk older suburbs is simple.
Regional equity gives them lower taxes and better serv-
ices. In the at-risk developed suburbs, taxes are com-
paratively high for the mix of services provided. In
states and regions without substantial state-supported
school equity, these taxes can be the highest in metro-
politan America. Simulations of property-tax sharing
throughout the country show the older suburbs as the
largest net gainers of resources of any of the subre-
gions. New equity resources could help older suburbs
shore up and improve aging infrastructure, clean up
brownfield sites, reconfigure abandoned malls or
industrial facilities, invest in housing in declining
neighborhoods, and give underfunded schools a boost.
If the equity is sufficiently comprehensive, such meas-
ures could be taken even as the local tax rates were
being reduced.
The residential resources of at-risk developed sub-
urbs are often deteriorating or threatened by rapid
change on their borders. A strong, well-implemented
housing plan that requires newer suburbs to take more
responsibility for affordable housing is the only way to
avoid this downward transition. Such a plan takes
pressure off the older suburbs and prevents the con-
centration of poverty and decline in these places. Once
older declining suburbs understand that they already
have more than their fair share of affordable housing,
they can use a good regional housing plan as a power-
ful defensive strategy to maintain their communities’
stability.
Without regional solutions, the future of these at-
risk places is bleak. With their low fiscal capacity and
lack of amenities, they have little hope of improving
their position in a competitive regional economy. If
they cut taxes, they cannot generate the revenues
needed to deal with their old infrastructure or poverty
problems in their schools. If they raise taxes to deal
with these challenges, they cannot attract businesses
or homeowners. In the end, these places have no
haven outside regional cooperation.
The Developing Suburbs
At-risk low-density and bedroom-developing suburbs
have three compelling reasons to support regional
cooperation. First, it will reduce their taxes and
increase their services, most notably in terms of
schools. Second, it will help them get the infrastructure
they need for safe and orderly development. And third,
it will provide a better alternative to local unilateral
growth moratoriums or slow-growth action to respond
to the increasingly negative reaction within these com-
munities to the development status quo.
While bedroom-developing communities are places
of comparatively low poverty and diversity, their chil-
dren-per-household ratio is very high. Throughout the
country, at-risk low-density suburbs spend less per
pupil than districts in other types of metropolitan
communities. Through school equity and almost any
form of tax sharing, both of these types of developing
communities can be among the largest recipients of
per-student aid. And as with the older suburbs, region-
Making the Case
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al fiscal equity can also allow these places to have
lower tax rates.
In chasing after development to make up for the
lack of a local tax base, developing communities tend
to neglect the provision of infrastructure that will even-
tually be needed but will be more costly to provide
retroactively once development is in place.
Regionalism provides assistance for infrastructure in
developing communities through equity, which can
give them money to build infrastructure as well as to
relieve cash-flow crises that force them to seek devel-
opment at any price, and through sharing regional
infrastructure costs. By pooling regional resources, and
creating regional funds and bonding authorities,
regionalism can get infrastructure to these communi-
ties in a cost-effective way.
Sprawl is another problem of particular concern to
residents of bedroom-developing suburbs. Most of the
local initiatives to curb growth have been in these
places. But a single community can have little effect on
the growth of a region. Acting alone, a community is
not only unlikely to solve its own growth-related prob-
lems but is likely to impose higher costs on the region
when it tries. In the end, regional or statewide plan-
ning to protect open space and create a regional
growth boundary has been more effective than unilat-
eral action. Regionally funded transit commuting alter-
natives are among the most promising ways to
respond to growing congestion. A cooperative regional
approach that encourages affordable housing close to
affluent job centers is also likely to be more helpful
than local NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) approaches.
Affluent Job Centers
Despite their low poverty rates and high fiscal capaci-
ties, affluent job centers are not immune from prob-
lems caused by the prevailing pattern of regional
development. Because they are intense centers of job
growth, these communities are often troubled by high-
er rates of congestion than other suburban areas, par-
ticularly in the country’s fast-growth regions. Open
space is harder to preserve in these communities,
because land becomes very valuable. In the most
extreme cases, suburban “edge cities” can become as
densely urban and congested as city business districts.
Some of the most celebrated and extreme fights
against status-quo development patterns have
occurred in this small group of suburbs. Here, too,
regionalism presents the only possible response to
these concerns, the only real way to maintain a subur-
ban/rural edge, and the only plausible plan for dealing
with traffic congestion. It is the only way to have an
effect on a neighboring community’s poor decisions.
Today’s metropolitan politics are based on an inac-
curate model of poor cities and rich suburbs. It does
not acknowledge that almost half of the U.S. popula-
tion lives in places that have finished developing and
have increasing urban problems. Nor does it come to
terms with the fiscal pressure of growth and the pub-
lic’s increasing discontent with sprawl and loss of open
space. A new metropolitics must understand the diver-
sity of U.S. suburbs and build a broad bipartisan
movement for greater regional cooperation. If metro-
politics does not succeed, our metropolitan regions
will continue to become more unequal, and more
energy will be spent growing against ourselves.
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